Faisal Mohamed Saleh*

We are seeing more and more signs that global or regional actors could intervene in Sudan, while this question has not been seriously discussed domestically. Nonetheless, it will certainly evoke mixed and contradictory reactions, as has happened in many of the countries where foreign actors intervened. Building consensus around such matters is impossible.

It is the duration of this war that put this issue on the table, as well as the fact that some realized, too late, that this conflict would not be resolved in days or weeks. Indeed, it could potentially last for months or even years before being decided in favor of one of the two sides, leading to thousands of civilian casualties and wreaking havoc on the capital Khartoum and the cities of Darfur. It could strike at everything, the presidential palace, government institutions, economic institutions, banks, factories, and citizens’ homes and property, as well as fuel internal displacement and external asylum.

Some neighboring countries are apprehensive about the battles that cost the armed forces critical positions. They are aware of the significance of the Rapid Support Forces taking control of these sites and that these battles could be a prelude to a broader attack. More precisely, there are worries about the RSF gaining control of the industrial complex in Al-Shajara, the arms depot in Omdurman, and the Wadi Seidna Air Base.

Losing these three positions would end the battles in the capital and cost the armed forces control of Khartoum. While they would maintain general command and control over garrisons in the periphery, the history of military coups in Sudan has shown that the military across the country pledges its loyalty to whoever controls Khartoum.

One concerned country in the region has informed the international forces following the developments in Sudan that it would not allow these sites to fall into the hands of the RSF, adding that it has two options. One is some form of intervention coordinated with regional and international actors and bodies that ends the battles and maintains the status quo until a negotiated comprehensive settlement is found. As for the second option, which this country would prefer to avoid but is ready for, is its direct intervention with strong air support and limited ground support.

In Africa, the African Union has been coordinating with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) throughout this crisis. Their preference is for sending African Standby Forces with funding and support from the international community, building on the example of the United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur, which stationed 40,000 civilians and soldiers for 13 years before withdrawing in 2020.

Citizens living in conflict areas, Khartoum and the states of Darfur, would welcome international intervention, simply because they are seeking protection that the belligerents have not provided. The army has taken cover in its barracks, leaving them at the mercy of the RSF’s looting, murder, assault of women, and forced displacement. It might wound their patriotic pride, but they have no other choice.

As for the political forces, they will be firmly divided on the matter. Some will reject international intervention in principle and claim that it violates Sudan’s national sovereignty. They will argue that elsewhere, like Libya and Yemen, international intervention could not restore stability and peace.

Other forces will counter that it is necessary, citing modern ideas in international politics, the principle of civilians’ right to protection and the need to maintain international peace and security, especially with the failure of national forces to resolve the problem domestically.

Islamists will be among the loudest objectors to international intervention, and they could even declare jihad against the intervening forces. The atmosphere of war has facilitated their return to the political arena, allowing them to present themselves as defenders of the homeland alongside the armed forces. They think that an army victory would enhance their standing and allow them, as part of the alliance that defeated the RSF, to take back their positions in the state positions.

That leaves us with the positions of the two warring factions: the armed forces and the RSF. The stances of these two parties will be determined based on the outcomes of the battles on the ground. Those who see themselves as being on the cusp of victory will see the international intervention as an impediment to reaping the fruits of success on the battlefield.

Meanwhile, the leadership of the armed forces will be divided. Some will see international intervention as an opportunity to salvage the situation and preserve the army as an institution, allowing it to maintain what remains of its symbolism and strength. Others will see the heavy political price that the leadership would pay for such an intervention. Any negotiated settlement through international intervention will push the current leaders of the armed forces and the RSF out of power. To those driven by personal ambitions and the desire to maintain power, this would be a great defeat.

*Sudan’s former Minister of Information